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WOMEN’S AUTONOMY IN NONDISCLOSURE
AGREEMENTS FOR SEXUAL MISCONDUCT CASES
Rachel L. Wagner*
I. INTRODUCTION
The #MeToo movement exposed many women’s issues, with nondis-
closure agreements (“NDAs”) taking center stage. Harvey Weinstein, the
now disgraced media mogul, thrust the #MeToo movement into the national
limelight in 2017 when numerous famous women accused him of rape.1 But
the original ‘me too’ movement began over a decade ago.2 Since its incep-
tion, the ‘me too’ movement has helped survivors of sexual violence, partic-
ularly Black women and girls and other young women of color from low-
wealth communities, find pathways to healing.3 This movement set out to
address “the dearth in resources for survivors of sexual violence and to
build a community of advocates, driven by survivors, who will be at the
forefront of creating solutions to interrupt sexual violence in their commu-
nities.”4 The movement helps survivors find the right resources for their
unique healing journey.5 A solution for some survivors is to enter into non-
disclosure agreements with their perpetrators. Although the origins of the
original ‘me too’ movement were rooted in survivor autonomy, in the wake
of #MeToo, many states have passed laws severely restricting the use of
NDAs in sexual misconduct cases.6 These laws undermine survivor auton-
omy and decrease the number of choices available to survivors.
The NDAs referenced in the following sections are contractual clauses
included within sexual misconduct settlement agreements that carry the
threat of legal ramifications if a survivor talks about their experience to
anyone. Sexual misconduct, as referenced here, encompasses sexual assault
and sexual harassment. A survivor is an individual who has been subjected
* Rachel Wagner, J.D. Candidate, Alexander Blewett III School of Law at the University of
Montana, Class of 2021.
1. Sarah Almukhtar, Michael Gold & Larry Buchanan, After Weinstein: 71 Men Accused of Sexual
Misconduct and Their Fall from Power, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2018, https://perma.cc/4U77-QUJG.
2. Tarana Burke, Get to Know Us, THE ‘ME TOO.’ MOVEMENT, https://perma.cc/5ZHZ-M4GC (last
visited Apr. 20, 2021).
3. Tarana Burke, History & Inception, THE ‘ME TOO.’ MOVEMENT, https://perma.cc/H54Z-DY6X
(last visited Feb. 20, 2021).
4. Joanne N. Smith & Tanara Burke, The ‘Me Too.’ Movement Lives at Girls for Gender Equality:
A Joint Letter, GIRLS FOR GENDER EQUALITY (June 7, 2018), https://perma.cc/H7QC-SY8T.
5. Burke, supra note 3. R
6. National Conference of State Legislatures, Legislation on Sexual Harassment in the Legisla-
ture, NCSL (Feb. 11, 2019), https://perma.cc/JN9P-4JRL.
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to sexual misconduct. This term is used to reflect the theme of autonomy in
the original ‘me too’ movement.7
Recently, laws restricting the use of NDAs in sexual misconduct cases
have gained widespread support.8 Supporters of these laws argue that
NDAs protect serial abusers from being discovered and prosecuted, thus
enabling further abuse.9 Supporters also argue that restricting NDAs forces
more transparency and accountability on employers, while also enabling
survivors to speak out about their experiences.10 However, in actuality, ban-
ning NDAs in sexual misconduct cases reinforces the lack of survivor au-
tonomy, an essential component of the original ‘me too’ movement and
contract theory.
A comparison of two state laws illustrates the role, or lack thereof, that
a survivor’s autonomy and individual choice play in NDA-related legisla-
tion. One on hand, California was the first state to pass a law limiting the
use of NDAs in sexual misconduct cases, passing one of the most restrictive
laws of its kind in 2018.11 Senate Bill 820, codified as Code of Civil Proce-
dure § 1001, voids any settlement agreement entered into on or after Janu-
ary 1, 2017 that prevents disclosure of factual information about claims of
sexual assault, sexual harassment, or harassment or discrimination based on
sex.12 If the settlement agreement does not comply with the restrictions, it is
void as a matter of public policy.13
In comparison, New York adopted N.Y. Civil Practice Law and Rules
§ 5003–b in 2018, prohibiting NDAs in sexual harassment agreements un-
less the confidentiality provision is the survivor’s preference.14 New York’s
law contains a mechanism giving the survivor twenty-one days to consider
the nondisclosure clause and, once signed, seven days to revoke the agree-
ment.15 Other states should consider adopting laws much like New York’s,
consciously drafted to both support survivor autonomy and choice, and to
serve the public interest of holding serial abusers accountable.
7. Tanara Burke, Vision and Theory of Change, THE ‘ME TOO.’ MOVEMENT, https://perma.cc/
3WJT-BET5 (last visited Feb. 20, 2021).
8. In 2018, legislation restricting use of NDAs in sexual misconduct cases was introduced in
Alaska, Arizona, California, Florida, Indiana, Kansas, Maryland, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, and Washington. Suzanne Hultin, Ad-
dressing Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, 26 LEGIS. BRIEF 17 (2018), https://perma.cc/7AGZ-
LRHA.
9. Senator Connie M. Leyva, SB 820 Protects Victims by Eliminating ‘Curtain of Secrecy’, Cali-
fornia State Senate (Aug. 24, 2018), https://perma.cc/5TKF-77UL.
10. Scott Altman, Do Non-Disclosure Agreements Hurt or Help Women? THE HILL, Nov. 12, 2019,
https://perma.cc/JL9B-86H3.
11. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1002 (West 2020).
12. Id.
13. Id. § 1002(c)–(d).
14. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5003-b (McKinney 2019).
15. Id.
2
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This article is organized as follows: Part I discusses the history of con-
tract law, addresses how courts evaluate NDAs in sexual misconduct cases,
and explores California and New York’s statutes as two examples of how
states restricted the use of NDAs in response to #MeToo. Part II focuses on
concepts of autonomy in contract law and discusses how feminist legal
scholars approach the idea of autonomy in the sexual domain. Part III ap-
plies traditional concepts of autonomy and incorporates feminist legal the-
ory to analyze the impact of the California and New York laws on survivor
autonomy. Part IV concludes by advocating for New York’s more nuanced
approach because it empowers survivors and synthesizes both traditional
and feminist concepts of autonomy.
II. BACKGROUND
A contract touches on both human relationships and the law. Contract
law is unique because parties choose their obligations voluntarily and those
obligations reflect the intentions of the contracting parties.16 Contracts are
about promises—created only through offer, acceptance, and consideration.
An offer is the manifestation of willingness to enter into a bargain so
that another person understands his assent to the agreement.17 To establish a
contract, an offer must be met with an appropriate acceptance, characteristi-
cally “a manifestation of assent to the terms [of the offer] made by the
offeree in a manner invited or required by the offer.”18 Further, the consid-
eration doctrine adds a bargain requirement to contract formation. The Re-
statement (Second) of Contracts explains, “[t]o constitute consideration, a
performance or a return promise must be bargained for” and adds “[a] per-
formance or return promise is bargained for if it is sought by the promisor
in exchange for his promise and is given by the promisee in exchange for
that promise.”19
Contract law “is distinct from both tort and fiduciary law in that con-
tract involves essentially chosen obligations.”20 To reflect this component
of choice, Samuel Williston noted he “[didn’t] see why a man should not be
able to make himself liable if he wishes to do so.”21 Additionally, other than
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts’ textual references to contractual
parties as male actors, which was standard language at the time, this “free-
16. DANIEL MARKOVITS, Theories of the Common Law of Contracts, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLO-
PEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2015), https://perma.cc/6MPR-L9EE.
17. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 24 (1981).
18. Id. § 50.
19. Id. § 71.
20. MARKOVITS, supra note 16, at § 1. R
21. MARKOVITS, supra note 16, at § 1. R
3
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dom to contract principle” is purportedly neutral.22 Freedom to contract
neutrality encompasses “race, age, socio-economic status, sexual orienta-
tion and all other aspects of life by which we differ from each other.”23
NDAs, also known as confidentiality provisions, are an example of
how parties choose their obligations in a contract. NDAs are a common
practice in business-related contracts and are frequently used in settlement
agreements.24 An NDA “in exchange of consideration or another promise,”
is a legally enforceable promise to keep silent about certain agreed-upon
information.25 NDAs aim to establish “a confidential relationship between a
person who holds some kind of . . . secret and a person to whom the secret
will be disclosed.”26 The general principles governing contract defenses,
including unconscionability, duress, and public policy, among others, also
apply to NDAs because NDAs are legally binding contracts. NDAs can be
challenged on freedom to contract grounds as well. The freedom to contract
is not absolute and may be modified by courts, either because the contract
lacks an essential element, or for public policy reasons.
Despite being legally binding contracts, when it comes to NDAs in-
volving sexual misconduct, an increasing number of survivors choose to
breach these contracts to speak publicly against their abuser and for their
own healing.27 Legislators have responded to these NDA breaches by intro-
ducing laws purporting to protect survivors who seek to disclose informa-
tion by preventing employers from keeping allegations of sexual miscon-
duct from the public.28 As of March 2020, more than sixteen states—most
recently New Mexico—have adopted bills restricting NDAs in sexual mis-
conduct cases.29
22. The gendered nature of contract law is because it historically pertained to market transactions,
which, by law and custom, excluded women. See e.g., Debora L. Threedy, Feminists & Contract Doc-
trine, 32 IND. L. REV. 1247, 1250–51 (1999).
23. HILA KEREN, Feminism and Contract Law, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON FEMINIST JURISPRU-
DENCE 406, 414 (Robin West & Cynthia Grant Bowman eds., 2019).
24. Ann Fromholz & Jeanette Laba, #MeToo Challenges Confidentiality and Nondisclosure Agree-
ments, 41 L.A. LAW. 12, 12 (2018).
25. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 (1981) (“A contract is a promise or a set of
promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the performance of which the law in some
way recognize as a duty”.).
26. Taishi Duchicela, Rethinking Nondisclosure Agreements in Sexual Misconduct Cases, 20 LOY.
J. PUB. INT. L. 54, 62 (2018).
27. Id.
28.  S. RULES COMM. OFF. OF S. FLOOR ANALYSES, UNFINISHED BUSINESS, S.B. NO. 820, at 3 (Ca.
2018).
29. National Conference of State Legislatures, supra note 6; Felicia O’Connor, New Mexico Latest R
State to Prohibit NDAs for Sexual Harassment Claims, JD SUPRA, LLC (Mar. 11, 2020), https://
perma.cc/AA3D-MJ2G.
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A. Courts’ Interpretation of NDAs in Sexual Misconduct Cases
As for the judiciary and its approach to enforcing NDAs, enforcement
turns on who is attempting to validate or invalidate the NDA—namely
whether it is the survivor themselves or a public agency. In making these
decisions, courts mainly have focused on two doctrines: the “unconsciona-
bility” doctrine and the “public policy” doctrine.30
Under the unconscionability doctrine, if the contract’s terms are “un-
conscionable,” a judge may refuse to enforce all or portions of the con-
tract.31 Although jurisdictions have differed on the precise meaning of “un-
conscionable,” it is generally defined as the lack of meaningful choice by
one of the parties combined with contract terms which are unreasonably
favorable to the other party or that are unduly oppressive to the weaker
party.32 The doctrine of unconscionability has both a procedural and sub-
stantive element, the former focusing on oppression or surprise because of
unequal bargaining power, and the latter on overly harsh or one-sided re-
sults of the contract.33 In practice, courts rarely invalidate sexual miscon-
duct NDAs on this basis.
Courts more commonly apply the public policy doctrine when decid-
ing whether to invalidate an NDA. Under the public policy doctrine, a term
of an agreement is unenforceable if either (1) legislation specifies that it is
unenforceable, or (2) the interest in enforcement is plainly outweighed by a
public policy against enforcing such terms.34 In applying this doctrine,
courts weigh the parties’ justified expectations against the consequences of
not enforcing the NDA.35 When weighing public policy interests, courts
look to existing legislation and how the contract connects to the policy in-
terest.36 In reality, while sexual misconduct NDAs may be void as a matter
of public policy, the circumstances in which NDAs are voided for public
policy reasons remain limited.
For example, sexual misconduct NDAs are void as a matter of public
policy if the NDA prevents a survivor from filing criminal sexual assault
charges or assisting the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
30. D. Andrew Rondeau, Opening Closed Doors: How the Current Law Surrounding Nondisclo-
sure Agreements Serves the Interests of Victims of Sexual Harassment, and the Best Avenues for Its
Reform, 17 U. CHI. L.F. 583, 587 (2019).
31.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981).
32. Junkermier, Clark, Companella, Stevens, P.C. v. Alborn, Uithoven, Reikenberg, P.C., 380 P.3d
747, 756 (Mont. 2016); Leibrand v. Nat’l Farmers Union Prop. & Cas. Co., 898 P.2d 1220, 1227 (Mont.
1995); Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
33. Baltazar v. Forever 21, Inc., 367 P.3d 6, 11 (Cal. 2016).
34. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178.
35. Id. § 178(2).
36. Id. § 178(3).
5
Wagner: <em>WOMEN’S AUTONOMY IN SEXUAL MISCONDUCT NDAs</em>
Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 2021
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\82-2\MON204.txt unknown Seq: 6  7-OCT-21 10:08
414 MONTANA LAW REVIEW Vol. 82
(“EEOC”) with its investigations.37 As the First Circuit reasoned in Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission v. Astra U.S.A., Inc.,38 “the EEOC
acts not only on behalf of private parties but also ‘to vindicate the public
interest in preventing employment discrimination.’”39 Therefore, settlement
agreements that prohibit employees from filing charges or assisting with
investigations conducted by the EEOC could impede the enforcement of
Title VII, thereby undermining existing legislation and the public interest.
The First Circuit also explained, “[i]n many cases of widespread discrimi-
nation, victims suffer in silence. In such instances, a sprinkling of settle-
ment agreements that contain stipulations prohibiting cooperation with the
EEOC could effectively thwart an agency investigation.”40
Yet when it comes to an individual’s desire to invalidate a nondisclo-
sure agreement on public policy or unconscionability grounds—as opposed
to the goals of a state or federal agency—courts are decidedly less sympa-
thetic. In Victoria C. v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc.,41 the Ninth Circuit upheld
confidentiality provisions of a nondisclosure agreement even when the sur-
vivor—after being raped by fourteen members of the Bengals football
team—presented evidence that she was suffering from post-traumatic stress
disorder when she signed the release.42 The survivor argued, in part,43 that
the NDA was obtained through undue influence and violated public pol-
icy.44 Much like the First Circuit’s reasoning in Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission, the court held that, because the victim was not pre-
cluded from reporting the sexual assaults to law enforcement and was, in-
stead, “merely prohibit[ed] [from] disclos[ing] . . . the terms of the release,”
the release did not violate public policy.45
However, it is not necessarily an individual’s choice to determine the
type of information that is ultimately confidential. In the interest of public
policy, at least one court has compelled a survivor to respond to deposition
questioning—despite the existence of a confidentiality clause in a settle-
ment agreement—regarding allegations of sexual harassment filed against a
former employer.46 There, the employer moved to compel this information
37. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2019).
38. 94 F.3d 738 (1st Cir. 1996).
39. Id. at 744 (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of the Nw., Inc., 446 U.S. 318, 326 (1980)).
40. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, 94 F.3d at 744.
41. No. 93-35595, 1994 WL 727752 (9th Cir. 1994).
42. Id. at *5–6, 9.
43. Id. at *3, 5 (Crytzer argued, in addition to her public policy and undue influence claims, that the
release was “ambiguous,” its contents “not certain and definite,” and the release lacked sufficient con-
sideration).
44. Id. at *1.
45. Id. at *5.
46. Bonsal v. Borgman Crate & Pallet, Inc., No. 4:07CV3165, 2008 WL 731749 (D. Neb., Mar. 17,
2008).
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from the plaintiff because it may have “reveal[ed] plaintiff’s pattern and
practice of raising sexual harassment allegations against employers.”47 Be-
cause the confidentiality clause did not prohibit the plaintiff from “disclos-
ing the alleged circumstances and allegations underlying her actual or
threatened legal action against [her employer], the names and titles of the
individuals involved, or the approximate time frame of these events” and
only prohibited disclosing the provisions of the settlement agreement, the
employer’s motion to compel was granted.48
Conversely, in Perricone v. Perricone,49 the Supreme Court of Con-
necticut enforced a divorce settlement agreement that barred a well-known
doctor’s ex-wife from sharing his affairs with media sources.50 There, the
court limited voidable nondisclosure provisions to the following categories:
terms that (1) restrict the “right to speak on matters of public concern,” (2)
restrict communication with a public agency regarding civil rights law en-
forcement, (3) require the “suppression of criminal behavior,” (4) suppress
information “important to public health and safety,” or (5) impose confiden-
tiality for the benefit of a “public entity or official.”51 These categories ap-
pear to benefit individuals who attempt to invalidate their NDAs. However,
as the Connecticut Supreme Court noted, the public policy doctrine “should
be applied with caution and only in cases plainly within the reasons on
which that doctrine rests . . . .”52 Thus, even if a term falls into one of these
categories, it may not be enforced by a court.
Moreover, as shown by the previous cases, courts are hesitant to apply
the public policy doctrine in private disputes. In Bandera v. City of
Quincy,53 a former employee of Quincy’s Community Police Commission
tried to invalidate a settlement agreement after her attorney allegedly
threatened her into signing the agreement.54 Bandera testified at trial that
she experienced discriminatory treatment during her employment, including
being “excluded from meetings, ridiculed, and subjected by male officers to
graphic details of their sexual exploits.”55 The settlement agreement in-
structed that both the facts underlying the dispute and the terms of the set-
tlement agreement would remain confidential.56 The court determined a
valid settlement agreement was established and reasoned, “Bandera’s as-
47. Id. at *1.
48. Id.
49. 972 A.2d 666 (Conn. 2009).
50. Id. at 690–91.
51. Id. at 688.
52. Id. at 687.
53. 344 F.3d 47 (1st Cir. 2003).
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serted subjective beliefs regarding the settlement likely do not bar enforce-
ment,” and no evident public policy reason existed to deny performance of
the contract.57
As a whole, courts are hesitant to find NDAs unenforceable as a matter
of unconscionability or as a matter of public policy, especially when the
dispute is between private parties. Courts are more likely to find an NDA
unenforceable where the settlement provisions undermine existing law, like
where the alleged harasser is under investigation by the EEOC or the settle-
ment agreement prevents the survivor from reporting a crime. And, contrary
to current legislation in some states,58 courts remain hesitant to factor in
harm to the survivor, power dynamics between the survivor and the perpe-
trator, or the appropriate remedy to fully compensate the survivor. The
above cases illustrate how courts are generally unwilling to stray from tradi-
tional notions of contract formation and struggle to consider the intricacies
necessary to fully support survivor autonomy.
B. Legislative Action Surrounding NDAs in the Context of Sexual
Misconduct Cases
Recently, a number of states have passed legislation restricting the use
of NDAs in sexual misconduct cases.59 California and New York are two
states that have passed ambitious laws in the wake of #MeToo. California’s
law, California Code of Civil Procedure § 1002, states:
(a) Notwithstanding any other law, a provision within a settlement agree-
ment that prevents the disclosure of factual information related to the action
is prohibited in any civil action the factual foundation for which establishes
a cause of action for civil damages for any of the following:
(1) An act that may be prosecuted as a felony sex offense
. . .
(4) An act of sexual assault, as defined paragraphs (1) to (9), inclusive, of
subdivision (e) of Section 15610.63 of the Welfare and Institutions Code,
57. Id. at 52. The male founders of contract law, including Holmes, Langdell, and Williston, be-
lieved that objectivity was superior to subjectivity. Feminists have long criticized objectivity as a domi-
nance preserving method, which is associated with rationality, neutrality, certainty, and efficiency.
KEREN, supra note 23, at 421. Subjectivity, in contrast, is related to or based upon beliefs, attitudes, and R
opinions instead of verifiable evidence. Subjective, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (Bryan A. Garner ed.,
11th ed. 2019).
58. State legislators in California, New Jersey, New York, Tennessee, Vermont, Washington, and
other states have adopted different laws to limit the use of NDAs. Erik Christiansen, How Are the Laws
Sparked by #MeToo Affecting Workplace Harassment? AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION (May 8, 2020),
https://perma.cc/R28Y-2XBG.
59. National Conference of State Legislatures, supra note 6. R
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against an elder or dependent adult, as defined in Sections 15610.23 and
15610.27 of the Welfare and Institutions Code.
(b) Notwithstanding any other law, in a civil action described in paragraphs
(1) to (4), inclusive, of subdivision (a), a court shall not enter, by stipulation
or otherwise, an order that restricts the disclosure of information in a man-
ner that conflicts with subdivision (a).60
When a court weighs whether to void an NDA as a matter of public
policy, it considers “the strength of that policy as manifested by legisla-
tion.”61 Because of recently enacted legislation, like California’s, courts in
those jurisdictions will be more likely to find NDAs unenforceable as a
matter of public policy. New York has taken a more nuanced approach to
its legislation:
Notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, for any claim or cause of
action, whether arising under common law, equity, or any provision of law,
the factual foundation for which involves sexual harassment, in resolving by
agreed judgment, stipulation, decree, agreement to settle, assurance of dis-
continuance or otherwise, no employer, its officer or employee shall have
the authority to include or agree to include in such resolution any term or
condition that would prevent the disclosure of the underlying facts and cir-
cumstances to the claim or action unless the condition of confidentiality is
the plaintiff’s preference. Any such term or condition must be provided to
all parties, and the plaintiff shall have twenty-one days to consider such
term or condition. If after twenty-one days such term or condition is the
plaintiff’s preference, such preference shall be memorialized in an agree-
ment signed by all parties. For a period of at least seven days following the
execution of such agreement, the plaintiff may revoke the agreement, and
the agreement shall not become effective or be enforceable until such revo-
cation period has expired.62
Courts generally embrace the freedom to contract principles inherent
in the formation of a legal promise, and therefore they tend to hold parties
accountable for their bargained-for exchange.63 Under this simple frame-
work, it logically follows that courts are hesitant to invalidate NDAs on the
basis of unconscionability and prefer to do so on public policy grounds.
However, upon closer inspection, the freedom necessary for autonomy re-
quires individuals to be treated as ends in themselves, not as means toward
the achievement of other public or private objectives. That is, using an indi-
vidual to further the ends of a public agency on public policy grounds un-
dermines the “freedom” essential to contract formation.
60. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1002(a)–(b) (West 2020).
61. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178(3)(a) (1981).
62. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5003-b (McKinney 2019).
63. Victoria C. v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc., No. 93-35595, 1994 WL 727752 (9th Cir. 1994); Per-
ricone v. Perricone, 972 A.2d 666 (Conn. 2009); Bandera v. City of Quincy, 344 F.3d 47 (1st Cir. 2003).
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Many states reexamined their approach to NDAs in response to the
#MeToo movement by passing legislation restricting NDA use in sexual
misconduct cases on public policy grounds.64 The most restrictive legisla-
tion, like California’s law, refuse to recognize the voluntary exchange of
promises between parties, while more nuanced legislation, like New York’s
law, promote freedom by enabling the survivor to choose whether the set-
tlement remains confidential.65 New York’s law further promotes survivor
autonomy through a mechanism that gives a survivor twenty-one days to
consider the NDA and, after signing, seven days to revoke the agreement.66
This mechanism attempts to address what the courts have been unwilling to
see—a survivor may lack meaningful choice at the time she agreed to the
confidentiality provision. However, the law does not strip the survivor of
the freedom to ultimately choose her obligations.
III. PRINCIPLES OF AUTONOMY IN CONTRACT LAW
Autonomy is an essential component of modern contract law. Founda-
tionally, the freedom to enter into contracts is a basic right reserved to the
people under Article I, Section 10 of the United States Constitution. One of
the main goals of contract law is to “empower individuals to pursue their
own vision of a distinctively human life.”67 Thus, contract law is grounded
in the will of the parties, and courts recognize this “freedom to contract”
principle.68
A. Concepts of Autonomy
There are many different conceptions of autonomy. Traditionally, au-
tonomy centered on an individual’s freedom to be a rational person. How-
ever, some have defined autonomy by looking at external constraints, while
others focus on autonomy through a lens of the whole. This subsection ex-
amines each of these conceptions in turn.
Autonomy can include the lack of outside control or pressure by others
and the government.69 This form of autonomy has been articulated as an
“opportunity concept” because it views freedom in terms of the options that
remain available rather than foreclosed.70 It focuses on the absence of exter-
64. See generally National Conference of State Legislatures, supra note 6. R
65. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1002(a)–(b); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5003-b.
66. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5003-b.
67. JAN M. SMITS, ADVANCED INTRODUCTION TO PRIVATE LAW 115 (2017).
68. Id.
69. EUGENE F. MILLER, Hayek’s The Constitution of Liberty: An Account of its Argument, at 42
(Inst. of Econ. Affairs 2010).
70. CHARLES TAYLOR, What’s Wrong With Negative Liberty, in 2 PHILOSOPHY AND THE HUMAN
SCIENCES: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS, 211, 213 (Cambridge University Press 1985).
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nal constraints—not internal constraints, such as inadequate information,
internalized standards, or fear. This “opportunity concept” is also purport-
edly value neutral because it centers on being free from interference by
other people, not on discriminating between “more or less significant free-
doms.”71 Under this theory, when a person is coerced, she no longer deter-
mines her own ends or plans her own life, but must act according to ends or
goals that are imposed by someone else.72 However, when external con-
straints, like coercion, are absent, individuals must bear the consequences of
their actions.73
In contrast, classical utilitarianism is concerned not with the separate-
ness of individuals but with promoting “welfare.”74 It focuses on discover-
ing which actions and policies maximize the well-being of the relevant
group.75 To determine the well-being of a group when an action or policy is
adopted, the sum of the benefits the members of the group would experi-
ence is compared to the total losses. The well-being of the group is simply
the total of the interests of all its members. But this type of intervention
does not differentiate between individuals—it prioritizes the whole.76 As
Kant famously articulated, true freedom requires that individuals be treated
as ends in themselves, not as means toward the achievement of other public
or private objectives.77 Utilitarianism is unable to give individuals this true
freedom.
Utilitarianism does not view measures intended to promote the well-
being of all humans, or other paternalistic government measures, as respect-
ing individual freedom.78 A state may not compel a person to do or to re-
frain from certain action because it will make her happier, or because, “in
the opinions of others, to do so would be wise, or even right.”79 While these
might be good reasons to persuade an individual to take certain actions, it
does not justify compelling a person to do so.80 Constraints on individual
freedom can only be warranted on a limited basis, such as preventing harm
to others.81
71. Id. at 219.
72. MILLER, supra note 69, at 39–40. R
73. Id. at 41.
74. Hiro N. Aragaki, Does Rigorously Enforcing Arbitration Agreements Promote “Autonomy,” 91
IND. L.J. 1143, 1149 (2015–2016); Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8
J. LEGAL STUD. 103, 105 (1979).
75. Posner, supra note 74, at 111. R
76. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 187 (1971).
77. MILLER, supra note 69, at 47. R
78. Aragaki, supra note 74, at 1149. R
79. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 13 (1859).
80. Id.
81. Aragaki, supra note 74, at 1149–50. R
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Autonomy has traditionally been used to denote freedom in terms of
self-realization, self-mastery, or self-determination.82 This conception of
autonomy focuses on the capacity of an agent to be a rational, independent-
thinking person who determines the course of her own life “rather than have
it be determined for her by tradition, peer pressure, or the force of habit.”83
Thus, an individual who is capable of reflecting on their desires is also
capable of making decisions that promote autonomy.
B. Traditional Concepts of Autonomy in Contract Law
As discussed, courts apply traditional notions of contract doctrine
when deciding whether to invalidate an NDA in a sexual misconduct case.
In some ways, this honors survivor autonomy at a fundamental level. For
one, according to Charles Fried, the promise principle in contract advances
autonomy because it links contractual obligation to “self-imposed” obliga-
tions.84 When a court chooses not to interfere with a private agreement be-
tween two parties, it honors the individual as separate from society and
respects the individual’s autonomy.85 Thus, by enforcing promises, contract
law advances individual freedom.86 Thus, courts’ interpretations of NDAs
rely on a survivor’s self-imposed commitment, thereby advancing princi-
ples of autonomy.
Autonomy also requires that individuals be free from external interfer-
ence. Fried emphasizes that contracts are private in origin; as such, the law
should not impose external public restraints that interfere with individual
choice but, instead, should enable the agreement on a neutral basis.87 Fried
is critical of those who are willing to overlook the explicit terms of the
contract to achieve notions of fairness or policy concerns.88 Thus, basing
contract law in individual choice is favorable and would “lead to conclu-
sions profoundly different from those that would result from any attempt to
rest contract law on other social policies . . . .”89 Essentially, Fried does not
82. Id. at 1150.
83. Id. at 1150–51.
84. CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 2 (2d. ed.,
1981). Charles Fried is a Professor of Law at Harvard Law School, where he has been teaching since
1961. He was also the Solicitor General of the United States from 1985 to 1989 and argued numerous
cases in front of the United States Supreme Court. He has authored many books on moral and political
theory, including Anatomy of Values, Right and Wrong, Modern Liberty, Contract as a Promise, and
Saying Where the Law Is.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 3.
88. Id. at 2.
89. Richard Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of Promising, 88 MICH. L.
REV. 489, 498 (1989).
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think external standards should intrude into a private contract.90 Because
the source of an obligation rests on the promise itself, Fried rejects those
who “fashion[ ] contractual obligation as a way to do justice between . . .”
the parties.91
Fried’s work emphasizes the importance of personal autonomy. Fried
asserts that, if we respect individuals as free persons, then we should, in
turn, respect the choices that they make. In fact, Fried argues that, when we
fail to respect an individual’s promises, “[w]e infantilize him.”92 Thus,
when a court invalidates an NDA on public policy grounds, it is not honor-
ing survivor autonomy.
C. #MeToo and the Influence of Feminist Perspectives of Autonomy in
Contract Law
While traditional contract law prioritizes individual choice, some femi-
nist legal theorists believe women are unable to freely consent under the
patriarchal laws that ban confidentiality provisions in NDAs reflect the con-
cerns of feminist legal theorists. Some feminist legal theorists argue that
traditional contract law doctrine is not appropriate when evaluating NDAs
in sexual misconduct cases.93 Despite current court precedent, some femi-
nist theorists, like Catherine MacKinnon, argue that traditional legal doc-
trines and theories incorporate male-skewed norms and values, leaving con-
tract law interwoven with male-dominated hierarchies of power and influ-
ence.94 Consequently, they argue the law has failed to capture the impact of
power in the sexual domain.95 For example, a survivor is not exercising free
choice by entering into a settlement agreement because she is actually sur-
rendering to male dominance under oppressive patriarchal norms.96 Thus,
as an extension of the patriarchal structure, current court precedent re-
flects—in both process and result—inherently biased contract doctrines and
theories that erode victim autonomy and choice.
Conversely, other feminist legal theorists argue that autonomy must
acknowledge that women have a central role in decision making, rejecting
the view that women are inherently subordinate and cannot consent freely.97
Feminist legal scholar Robin West has proposed that autonomy in the con-
90. FRIED, supra note 84, at 3. R
91. Id.
92. Id. at 21.
93. KEREN, supra note 23, at 414. R
94. See generally CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE
(1989).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 182.
97. See generally Robin West, The Difference in Women’s Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological
Critique of Feminist Legal Theory, 3 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 81, 96–97 (1987).
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text of consent does not always mean choosing an alternative that fits one’s
self-interest.98 West argues that sometimes “consent arises from an effort to
increase the pleasure or satisfy the desires of others,” thus perhaps benefit-
ing the world in some way, even if the women themselves do not benefit.99
West articulates many different forms of consent, from the pursuit of some-
thing that one truly desires, a choice that is the lesser of two evils, or even
the endurance of “unpleasant, unwanted, nonmutual, and nonetheless fully
‘consensual’ sex.”100 Consent, and thus autonomy, is flexible and reflects
the distinctiveness of women’s lives.
While West and MacKinnon’s arguments primarily involve consent in
the context of sex, the arguments are directly applicable to contract law,
particularly in the nexus between contract law and the lack of consent in-
volved in sexual misconduct. Further, although the limits of consent are
recognized through modern defenses against contract enforcement, like du-
ress, undue influence, and unconscionability, courts are hesitant to invali-
date contracts on these grounds.
Additionally, some feminist theorists have criticized a dominant theory
within contract law—objectivity.101 Sam Williston, along with other classi-
cal contract theorists, believed in the superiority of objectivity over subjec-
tivity in contract law.102 This is evident by the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts’ insistence on “manifestations of mutual assent” and the require-
ment of consideration.103 These concepts help solidify and objectify the in-
tent behind a contract.
Some feminist theorists believe objectivity is inherently biased and
serves as a dominance-preserving method.104 Many feminist theorists argue
objectivity does not truly exist and is falsely presented as neutral con-
cept.105 They argue, “[a]s long as we live in a society where men dominate
women, objectivity will be by definition male.”106 These feminist scholars
believe that, rather than look at the contract on its face, courts should seri-
ously evaluate the inequality of bargaining power between the parties.107
98. Id.
99. Id. at 92.
100. Id. at 144.
101. LINDA MULCAHY, The Limitations of Love and Altruism–Feminist Perspectives on Contract
Law, in FEMINIST THEORY IN CONTRACT LAW 2 (Linda Mulcahy & Sally Wheeler eds., 2005).
102. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 63 (1981); KEREN, supra note 23, at 421 R
103. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 3, 17, 18, 22, 23, and 24.
104. See generally Mary Joe Frug, Rescuing the Impossibility Doctrine: A Postmodern Feminist
Analysis of Contract Law, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1029 (1992); Dana Raigrodski, Reasonableness and
Objectivity: A Feminist Discourse of the Fourth Amendment, 17 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 153, 190 (2008).
105. MULCAHY, supra note 101, at 2. R
106. A.W. Phinney III, Feminism, Epistemology, and the Rhetoric of Law: Reading Bowen v. Gil-
liard, 12 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 151, 176 (1989).
107. See, e.g., Debora L. Threedy, Feminists & Contract Doctrine, 32 IND. L. REV. 1247 (1999).
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California’s law reflects the influence of dominance feminism—the
concept that male-skewed norms and values are inherent in traditional con-
tract law and doctrine. Under this theory, women are incapable of exercis-
ing free choice in the face of an oppressive patriarchal structure. However,
New York’s law reflects a more nuanced approach to a valid feminist con-
cern. New York’s law promotes survivor autonomy by enabling women to
make choices consistent with their own goals and priorities, while also re-
storing the bargaining power in settlement negotiations through a built-in
revocation mechanism.108 Although recent legislation reflects the work of
feminist legal scholars, the challenge remains for most states to craft laws
restricting the use of NDAs in sexual misconduct cases in ways that honor
survivor autonomy while also preserving the integrity of the freely chosen
obligations that validate contract law.
IV. THE IMPACT OF THE CALIFORNIA AND NEW YORK LAWS ON
SURVIVOR AUTONOMY
A. State Laws that Ban Confidentiality Provisions in NDAs Undermine
Survivor Autonomy Because They Deprive Women of the
Choice to Utilize Important Tools
State laws that void NDAs containing confidentiality provisions—like
California’s—reinforce sex inequality and women’s inferiority by sug-
gesting that, because of their subordinated status, women are incapable of
making rational choices in the face of sexual harassment, and, therefore,
must rely solely on the judgment of the legal system. These laws dis-
empower women who have been subjected to sexual misconduct by deny-
ing them the opportunity to use legal tools, like confidential settlements, to
obtain a financial remedy for their harm. California’s law reinforces the
very power structures it purports to undermine.
The California legislature reinforces female subordination by using its
societal power to erode survivor choice and autonomy. As evidenced by the
law, once again “men control women by perpetuating a legal system that
reinforces gender inequality. . . , keeping women financially and legally
powerless.”109 In its committee report, the California legislature asserted
that NDAs “keep the details of cases from being revealed and end up silenc-
ing victims from speaking about their experiences.”110 The report expressed
a concern that settlements could be “used to allow serial harassers—espe-
108. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5003-b (McKinney 2019).
109. Andrea Mazingo, The Intersection of Dominance Feminism and Stalking Laws, NW. J. L. &
SOC. POL’Y 335, 337–339 (2014).
110. ASSEMB. COMM. ON JUDICIARY, SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS: CONFIDENTIALITY, CA. B. ANALY-
SIS S.B. 820, 242nd Reg. Sess. (Ca. 2018).
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cially those with significant financial resources—to escape criminal prose-
cution and continue their behavior unchecked.”111 Citing public policy rea-
sons in support of banning “secret settlements” in matters involving “partic-
ularly vulnerable victims” and an interest in preventing conduct that
presents an “ongoing hazard,”112 the report explicitly compared women sur-
vivors to children “who ought to receive special protection.”113 California’s
law infantilizes women by acting as an oppressive force on survivors of
sexual misconduct, reinforcing inherent power structures and undermining
survivor autonomy.
California’s law explicitly illustrates how the state both creates and
justifies society, remaining legitimate under the guise of being objective,
while preserving the state’s position as a mirror of society.114 Further, Cali-
fornia’s law reflects the dominant patriarchal view that women are inferior
and incapable of rational choice. The structure of the law is hierarchal in
nature and controls social order by “embodying and ensuring male control
over women’s sexuality at every level.”115 Laws that severely restrict a sur-
vivor’s ability to enter into NDAs in sexual misconduct cases have the ef-
fect of maintaining the dominant power structures. Curiously, the laws
passed in response to #MeToo have been immune from feminist critique,
perhaps because even feminist scholars are unable—or unwilling—to rec-
ognize how these laws undermine female empowerment and autonomy.
Laws prohibiting confidentiality provisions in NDAs assume that all
women who have experienced sexual misconduct are “victims,” stereotyp-
ing them as vulnerable, fearful, and easily controlled and manipulated,
rather than seeing the complexity of and differences among them.116 This
view is different from the survivor-driven mission of the original ‘me too’
movement. Stereotyping women as vulnerable victims misses, for example,
that the experiences of black women may be in stark contrast to those of
white women, or that the experiences of poor women will vary from those
with more financial resources or power. These laws deny women the ability
to define for themselves, based on their unique experiences, what to include
in a confidentiality provision, and instead categorize all women as victims
needing legal protection. California’s law improperly assumes that all wo-




114. Beth Ann Headley, Feminist Theories of Autonomy and Their Implications for Rape Law Re-
form, 437 SCHOLARWORKS U. MONT. 1, 13 (2007).
115. MACKINNON, supra note 94, at 644. R
116. Leigh Goodmark, When Is a Battered Woman Not a Battered Woman? When She Fights Back,
20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 75, 85 (2008).
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tize safety and perpetrator accountability. However, women have many dif-
ferent goals when they decide to enter into a settlement agreement.117
The California legislature inappropriately assumed banning NDAs
would enhance safety and women who have been victims of sexual harass-
ment would choose safety over autonomy. The committee rejected argu-
ments that banning NDAs would “interfere with the settlement of claims
alleging sexual harassment or assault, by forcing companies to trial in order
to preserve their public imagine/brand,” opting instead to pass the law on
public policy grounds.118 Yet, there does not appear to be evidence that
California’s law will enhance safety,119 and settlement agreements that pre-
vent a survivor from reporting a crime have always been void as a matter of
public policy. Further, by assuming that women who have been subjected to
sexual misconduct would choose public safety over autonomy, the legisla-
ture fails to consider women have unique reasons to enter into settlement
agreements. And, for some, entering into a confidential settlement agree-
ment is the safest option.120
While it is likely a law banning NDAs will promote traditional notions
of public safety and justice, it is equally likely banning NDAs will interfere
with settlement claims involving sexual misconduct by encouraging compa-
nies to litigate in order to preserve their public image. Accordingly, the law
could have the effect of subjecting victims to unwanted public scrutiny,
trauma, and financial drain. As a result, survivors may be less likely to
come forward with their experiences, and the threat of litigation will have a
disproportionate impact on women with fewer resources and less societal
power. Thus, California’s law is an external influence on survivors of sex-
ual misconduct that erodes autonomy and choice. Put simply, laws like Cal-
ifornia’s reinforce the power structures that subordinate women.
B. New York’s Law Empowers Women and Promotes Survivor
Autonomy by Supporting the Individual Choices of Women
New York’s law recognizes and serves the individual choices of survi-
vors by allowing a settlement regarding sexual misconduct, so long as the
117. For example, some women choose to enter into settlement agreements to avoid the stress of
litigation. For other women, they choose to prioritize their privacy and avoid disclosure of the sexual
misconduct to family members, future employers, or the public. Gloria Allred, Opinion: Gloria Allred:
Assault Victims Have Every Right to Keep Their Trauma and Their Settlements Private, L.A. TIMES,
Sept. 24, 2019, https://perma.cc/ZPU5-24HK.
118.  ASSEMB. COMM. ON JUDICIARY, supra note 110. R
119. See, e.g., Goodmark, supra note 116. R
120. Marissa Ditkowsky, #USTOO: The Disparate Impact of and Ineffective Response to Sexual
Harassment of Low-Wage Workers, 26 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 69, 98 (2019) (stating that employees may
want an NDA to avoid damage to their reputation, retaliation, and lack of recourse, particularly those
with fewer resources).
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survivor prefers it, makes an informed decision in signing, and does not
revoke it.121 Under the New York approach, the freedom of choice granted
to the survivor restores that party’s bargaining power in a settlement negoti-
ation. New York promotes victim choice by abandoning its “protection of
those who would discriminate and sexually harass in the workplace” and
focusing on “recogniz[ing] and serv[ing] victims of discrimination.”122
New York’s law recognizes that victimization and autonomy are not mutu-
ally exclusive. The law places the power in the hands of the women, taking
a more nuanced approach and furthering the goals of the original ‘me too’
movement. Therefore, survivors of sexual misconduct are able to exercise
autonomy in making choices consistent with their own goals and priorities.
The New York law contains a mechanism granting the survivor
twenty-one days to decide whether she wants to prevent the disclosure of
any underlying facts and circumstances of the claim.123 Moreover, upon
execution of the agreement, the law gives the victim at least seven days to
revoke the agreement,124 thus recognizing the complexity and differences in
the decision-making process for each woman. New York’s law, while not a
perfect solution, respects the rights of individual women to choose whether
and how to use the civil legal system, therefore promoting autonomy and
agency.
The choices women make to keep settlement agreements confidential
may have some negative consequences for society. Perpetrators may be able
to continue their behavior without direct social consequences, and other wo-
men may become victims as a result. Some women will be coerced,
threatened, and revictimized through the process of entering into a settle-
ment agreement. However, allowing individuals to choose is essential to
their autonomy. Even though some women will experience harm from these
choices, others will be empowered by the ability to make choices for them-
selves in the context of their own lives, rather than having the legal system
impose decisions upon them based on what they “should” want or out of a
state-perceived need for protection. Women have the right to make deci-
sions many will disagree with, dislike, or even fear. Thus, New York’s law
promotes survivor autonomy because it allows women to choose whether to
utilize important tools, like confidentiality provisions, while also providing
a critical mechanism to address situations where such choice is compro-
mised.
121. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5003-b (McKinney 2019).
122.  N.Y. COMM. REPORT, RELATES TO INCREASED PROTECTIONS FOR PROTECTED CLASSES AND
SPECIAL PROTECTIONS FOR EMPLOYEES WHO HAVE BEEN SEXUALLY HARASSED, 2019 N.Y. A.B. 8421,
242nd Reg. Sess. 1 (N.Y. 2019).
123. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5003-b.
124. Id.
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V. CONCLUSION
Creating space for individual choice honors the differences between
women, recognizing that race, class, sexual orientation, disability status,
and many other variables inform a woman’s response to their experience of
sexual misconduct. New York’s law enables women subjected to sexual
misconduct to decide how they will engage with the legal system by re-
specting their autonomy and allowing them to take part in building the solu-
tions they perceive are the best to meet their goals, whether those goals are
safety, perpetrator accountability, a financial remedy, or keeping their ex-
periences private.
To further the public’s interest in holding abusers accountable, while
also supporting victim autonomy, states should adopt laws like New
York’s. First, the law holds perpetrators accountable by giving a victim
twenty-one days to consider the NDA clause, and, after signing, seven days
to revoke the agreement. This mechanism provides a buffer from the coer-
cion, threats, and situational trauma the courts have been unwilling to con-
sider, but that many victims still experience at the time of signing a settle-
ment. Second, the law supports victim autonomy and choice through this
unique mechanism and by allowing the victim to decide whether to keep
information related to the underlying claim confidential.
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